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As shown in the introductory chapter of this volume (Archibugi et al. 2011), for centuries 
intellectuals from Europe and other parts of the world have devised institutional blueprints 
aimed at ‘domesticating’ international politics – that is, at imbuing it with the alleged virtues 
of the domestic politics of well-functioning states, notably strictly controlled use of violence, 
rule of law, and/or democratic methods of conflict resolution. Critiques of such projects have 
also been heard for centuries. Often the targets of criticism have been not the blueprints 
themselves but the perceived lack of a realistic explanation of how to get from here to there, 
i.e. the features of possible transition paths towards the more peaceful and just world order 
envisaged by their authors. For instance, in his commentary on the ‘project for settling an 
everlasting project in Europe’ presented in 1713 by Charles-Irénée Castel, abbé de Saint-
Pierre, Jean-Jacques Rousseau wrote in 1756 that ‘though the scheme in itself was wise 
enough, the means proposed for its execution betray the simplicity of the author... this good 
man saw clearly enough how things would work, when once set going, but… he judged like a 
child of the means for setting them in motion’ (Rousseau 1756/2008: 126). Almost two and a 
half centuries years later, Philippe Schmitter berated proponents of cosmopolitan democracy 
such as Daniele Archibugi and David Held in similar terms: ‘What is even more discouraging 
                                                 
1
 I am grateful to Daniele Archibugi, Robert Goodin and Raffaele Marchetti for their useful comments 
and suggestions, while remaining responsible for any shortcomings.  
than a credible idea of the end-product is the almost complete absence of any idea of the 
process whereby the world might get there’ (Schmitter 1999: 940). 
Militant cosmopolitan democrats may be tempted to respond in the spirit of Winston 
Churchill, who declared in 1946 that ‘We must build a kind of United States of Europe… The 
process is simple. All that is needed is the resolve of hundreds of millions of men and women 
to do right instead of wrong and to gain as their reward blessing instead of cursing’ (Churchill 
1946/1988: 664). Of course, such an answer would be unlikely to satisfy most political 
scientists, whose job often consists in accounting for outcomes that do not seem to be really 
wanted by anyone and that are variously explained with reference to structural constraints, 
collective action dilemmas, psychological biases, and a range of other devices drawn from 
the analytical toolbox of the social sciences. If the case for global democratic blueprints such 
as those presented by Marchetti (2011, in this volume) and Murithi (2011, in this volume) is 
to be intellectually compelling, discussions about their feasibility should be firmly based on 
the knowledge of constraints on political choice that has been accumulated since Niccolò 
Machiavelli affirmed the importance of studying politics as it is and not just how we would 
like it to be.  
But a careful examination of the conditions for, and pathways to, global democracy is equally 
necessary if the project is to be politically consequential, as sympathetic political actors need 
to be persuaded that it is worth pursuing. To provide a simple but pertinent concrete 
illustration of this point: a sample of the participants in the 2005 World Social Forum (WSF) 
was asked whether it was a good or bad idea to have a democratic world government. For 32 
per cent it was a bad idea, for 39 per cent it was a good idea but not plausible, and 29 per cent 
responded that it is a good idea and plausible (Chase-Dunn et al. 2008). It would not be too 
farfetched to infer that, at present, a majority of WSF activists would be unwilling to 
campaign for democratic world government, but also that such a campaign would have a 
chance to gather majority support among them if the sympathetic but sceptical participants 
became persuaded of its feasibility.
2
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 Among the general public, support for global democratic institutions seems to be weaker but still 
sizeable. A 2007 international opinion poll commissioned by the BBC asked the following question to 
approximately 12,000 respondents in 15 countries: ‘How likely would you be to support a Global Parliament, 
where votes are based on country population sizes, and the global parliament is able to make binding policies?’ 
14.4% responded ‘Very likely–it is a good idea’; 23.1% responded ‘Quite likely–but with reservations’; 14.9% 
What can empirical social science contribute to such debates? Among the various directions 
of analysis that appear to be fruitful, this chapter considers two. It should be stressed that the 
focus here is on the transition to global democracy, rather than its consolidation and survival, 
although the latter are also very important questions. First, analysts can try to determine the 
necessary conditions for a transition to global democracy. Second, they can try to determine 
the various paths that could lead to global democracy. For instance, Kate Macdonald (2011, 
in this volume) offers a thorough analysis of one possible pathway to global democracy, 
which is based on the progressive democratization of non-state structures of transnational 
governance. 
One way of thinking about transition paths is in terms of sufficient conditions. Whereas the 
necessity of a condition does not depend on the presence or absence of other conditions, 
conditions can be - and usually are – sufficient only in combination with other conditions; in 
other words, analysts should expect that (a) particular combinations of conditions, rather than 
individual conditions, are sufficient to produce an outcome (‘conjunctural causation’), and (b) 
that several different combinations of conditions may be sufficient for the outcome to occur 
(‘equifinality’). The identification of different paths to global democracy may be 
conceptualized as the search for particular combinations of favourable conditions that can be 
seen as reliably associated with the outcome. Conjunctural causation and equifinality make 
the study of potentially sufficient conditions significantly more complex than the study of 
potentially necessary conditions. This chapter does not aim to perform this more demanding 
task, and instead focuses on necessary condition hypotheses. The next section discusses their 
role in the context of global democratization and the third section draws some lessons from 
experiences of domestic democratization, which are analysed through a systematic method 
called fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis. A tentative research agenda on the 
identification of viable paths to global democracy is sketched in the final section. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
responded ‘Quite unlikely–but it might work’; and 19.1% responded ‘Very unlikely–it is a bad idea’. Cross-
national differences are very significant: an overwhelming majority of Indian respondents supported a global 
parliament, while U.S. and Danish respondents were the most opposed (BBC 2007). 
Thinking about necessary conditions for global 
democratization 
Robert Dahl expressed a widely held opinion when he stated that ‘the conditions required for 
the function of democratic institutions simply do no exist at the international level and are 
unlikely to develop within any foreseeable time’ (Dahl 1999a: 927). Hence, he concluded, 
‘even if the threshold is pretty hazy… international systems will lie below any reasonable 
threshold of democracy’ (Dahl 1999b: 21). Statements such as these raise at least two 
important questions. First, and more generally, how can we know if a given condition is 
necessary for democracy or not? Second, and more specifically, which conditions should be 
regarded as necessary for democracy? 
With regard to the first question, scepticism about the possibility of global democracy can be 
based on the belief that countries experiencing successful transitions to democracy did so 
because of the presence of certain prerequisites, and that these prerequisites are lacking at the 
international level, now and in the foreseeable future. The comparison between democratic 
and non-democratic countries is thought to provide insights into the possibility of 
democratizing global politics. In other words, not only optimists but also sceptics about 
global democracy may rely, implicitly or explicitly, on a ‘domestic analogy’, which in its 
broader definition is ‘presumptive reasoning […] about international relations based on the 
assumption that since domestic and international phenomena are similar in a number of 
respects, a given proposition which holds true domestically, but whose validity is as yet 
uncertain internationally, will also hold true internationally’ (Suganami 1989: 24). 
Diagnostic (as opposed to prescriptive) domestic analogies have been used to affirm as well 
as to deny the possibility of global democracy.
 3
 An important recent example of the 
‘possibilist’ use is Robert Goodin’s argument that ‘Similar things seem to be happening in 
today’s international order as happened centuries ago in the domestic sphere to curtail the 
arbitrary exercise of power and to make it accountable’ (Goodin 2010: 181). ‘Absence-of-
conditions’ arguments against the possibility of global democracy often use the same logic in 
reverse, for they draw on what is known about the successful democratization of states to 
deny the possibility of democratization at the global level.  
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 See Suganami (1989: 136) for the distinction between the diagnostic and the prescriptive use of the 
domestic analogy. 
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to examine the validity of this domestic analogy. It is 
sufficient that it is plausible enough to warrant an examination of its premises.
4
 Despite their 
numerous differences, both international systems and domestic political systems consist of a 
multitude of collective actors who engage in a variety of modes of interaction – from 
coercion and competition to negotiation and cooperation – on the basis of complex power 
relations, conflicting and compatible interests, and norms of appropriate behaviour. A rigid 
analytical separation is therefore unwarranted (Milner 1991). As those interactions can be 
considered more or less democratic within the context of individual states, it is legitimate to 
apply similar criteria to analyze political structures beyond that level (Moravcsik 2005). By 
extension, the question ‘under what conditions can a political system be democratized?’ can 
be legitimately asked with regard to international as well as intra-national interactions.  
I thus accept that insights garnered from the study of domestic political processes may be 
relevant to arguments about potential international processes. But do sceptical conclusions 
follow from this premise? To provide an answer, we need to examine the experience of 
democratic countries in order to test claims that certain conditions were necessary for their 
democratization.  If any condition is identified as necessary in the domestic context, we need 
to ask whether it can be found at the international level. If any necessary condition is 
identified that is not present and cannot be replicated at the international level, we would be 
left with strong reasons to believe global democracy – or at least forms of global democracy 
that resemble those realized within states (see Marchetti 2011, in this volume)
5
 – to be 
impossible. But such a conclusion hinges on the basic question: are there any such 
conditions? 
The second question posed at the beginning of this section is exactly which conditions can 
plausibly be regarded as necessary for democratic transitions and thus deserve closer 
examination. Clearly a large number of conditions are necessary for any interesting social 
process to occur, but most of them are trivial – for instance, air is a necessary condition for 
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 The domestic analogy could be expressed ‘If x is necessary for domestic democracy, then x is 
necessary for global democracy’ (to which sceptics add ‘x is absent at the global level’). This chapter focuses on 
the ‘if’ part of the argument, not the ‘then’ part.  
5
 Polycentric forms of global democracy, such as those advocated by K. Macdonald (2011), T. 
Macdonald (2011) and Bruno Frey (2011) in their contributions to this volume, are less vulnerable to this kind 
of argument.  
freedom of speech.
6
 A first step is thus to discriminate among conditions and to select non-
trivial conditions for closer analysis. A useful second step is to divide such conditions in two 
broad categories: those related to structures and those related to agency. The question of the 
relationship between agency and structure is at the core of many ontological debates in the 
social and political sciences, and cannot be addressed in any depth here.
7
 For the limited 
purposes of this chapter it suffices to say that approaches to the study of democratization are 
commonly distinguished on the basis of whether they emphasise structural ‘background’ 
conditions or rather the goals and strategic interactions of political actors. 
A key forerunner of the ‘structuralist’ approach was Seymour Martin Lipset (1959), whose 
conjectures on economic development as requisite of democratization had a decisive impact 
on subsequent scholarship. The agency-oriented or voluntarist approach was propelled by 
Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter’s (1986) path-breaking volumes on ‘transitions 
from authoritarian rule’. Despite several attempts at integrating the two perspectives,8 the 
debate shows little sign of abating. A scholar who emphasizes structural factors has lamented 
that for actor-oriented scholars ‘democratization is ultimately a matter of political crafting. It 
seems that democracy can be crafted and promoted in all sorts of places, even in culturally 
and structurally unfavorable circumstances’ (Doorenspleet 2004: 301). On the other side, 
Larry Diamond has insisted that, ‘[c]learly, most states can become democratic, because most 
states already are. Moreover… the overwhelming bulk of the states that have become 
democratic during the third wave [of democratization] have remained so, even in countries 
lacking virtually all of the supposed ‘conditions’ for democracy.’ (Diamond 2003: 5). 
                                                 
6
 A necessary condition can be considered trivial when it is present across all cases in the relevant 
universe of analysis. An in-depth discussion of the trivialness of necessary conditions is provided by Goertz 
(2006). 
7
 All action is ultimately determined by some kind of structure, but the reverse is not necessarily true. 
While this general point would support a ‘structuralist’ worldview, it is of little relevance for actual empirical 
research. Since no research agenda can capture all structures that may determine action, it is perfectly legitimate 
for research programmes to focus on some structures and neglect others, and the former may well ‘only’ 
constrain the behaviour of actors without determining or even affecting their desires and beliefs. This means that 
an agency-oriented research programme is legitimate even in the context of an ultimately structuralist 
worldview. 
8
 For a thorough examination of such attempts see Mahoney and Snyder (1999). 
In sum, the search for necessary conditions in the context of domestic democratization 
provides a good starting point for reflecting about plausible necessary conditions for global 
democratization. This search should involve conditions highlighted by structuralist 
approaches as well as those stressed by voluntarist approaches, and this distinction can 
provide a useful framework for analysing democratic processes beyond the state as well. The 
next section singles out a number of conditions that are especially relevant in controversies 
about global democratization, and investigates whether they can be regarded as necessary in 
the domestic context.   
 
 
Searching for necessary conditions for domestic 
democratization 
In this section I look for necessary conditions for the transition of democracy within states by 
comparing systematically the experiences of a large number of countries with the aid of a 
method called ‘fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis’. Large-scale comparisons are 
easier with regard to structural conditions than with regard to agential and strategic 
conditions. This is mainly because the former are captured by a number of existing datasets, 
whereas to the best of my knowledge there is no dataset that provides a standardized 
description of the political strategies and interactions in all or most countries that have 
experienced a democratic transition. For this reason, only structural conditions are subject to 
systematic scrutiny in this section, while the necessity of agential conditions is addressed 
more cursorily at the end. 
Which structural conditions should be included in the assessment of necessity? Some 
conditions are trivial, in the sense described above. Others, while not trivial, are not directly 
relevant to a discussion of global democracy. The analysis should include those conditions 
whose alleged weakness or absence at the global level has been invoked as reasons to be 
sceptical about the possibility of global democracy.
9
 Among those reasons are: (a) cultural 
heterogeneity in the world is an insurmountable obstacle to democracy; (b) most of the world 
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 For instance Dahl (1999b), Doyle (2000), Nye (2002), Keohane (2003), and Christiano (2011, in this 
volume). See also Offe (2006). 
is too poor to allow the emergence of democratic institutions; (c) democracy at the global 
level could not work because of huge differences in the economic conditions of the world’s 
inhabitants; (d) the world is too large to allow the establishment of democratic institutions; 
(e) democracy can only emerge in the context of established statehood, i.e. within a polity 
where the monopoly of legitimate force by a central institution has deep historical roots and 
is taken for granted by the population. The question thus is which (if any) of the following 
conditions can be considered as necessary for democratic transitions in the domestic context: 
(a) cultural and ethnic homogeneity; (b) economic development; (c) relatively high levels of 
economic equality; (d) a small or moderate polity size; and (e) established statehood.  
Condition (e) requires some elaboration. There are authors who maintain that ‘[d]emocracy is 
a form of governance of a modern state. Thus, without a state, no modern democracy is 
possible’ (Linz and Stepan 1996: 17). As I argue elsewhere (Koenig-Archibugi 2010), there 
are reasons to believe that a degree of political centralization is a necessary condition for 
democracy, but it is debatable whether this requires a monopoly over legitimate violence.
10
 
According to Chris Brown (2002: 246), ‘Contemporary liberal democracies emerged from 
pre-democratic state-structures; by analogy, global democracy would require the existence of 
a global state-structure that could be democratized.’11 But how can we test the hypothesis that 
democracy can only emerge after a relatively long experience and generalized acceptance of 
statehood? One way to do so is to ask whether democratic governance emerged after periods 
in which the key element of statehood – the monopoly over legitimate violence – was 
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 Democracy requires ability to enforce collective decisions. But legal rules produced by a political 
unit are not enforced only when the unit possesses the key attributes of statehood, notably a monopoly of the 
legitimate use of force and bureaucratic control over a territorial jurisdiction. The most notable example of this 
disjunction is the European Union. For instance, J. H. H. Weiler (2003) interprets the EU as a combination of a 
‘confederal’ institutional arrangement and a ‘federal’ legal arrangement. On the one hand, EU law is accepted as 
having direct effect in the jurisdictions of member states and supremacy over national law, without significant 
problems of compliance. On the other hand, EU institutions lack both the means of coercion and the 
bureaucratic apparatus to enforce EU law. ‘There is a hierarchy of norms: Community norms trump conflicting 
Member State norms. But this hierarchy is not rooted in a hierarchy of normative authority or in a hierarchy of 
real power. Indeed, European federalism is constructed with a top-to-bottom hierarchy of norms, but with a 
bottom-to-top hierarchy of authority and real power.’ (Weiler 2003: 9). Zürn and Joerges (2005) show 
systematically that the experience of the EU disproves the thesis that a central monopoly of force is necessary to 
ensure high levels of compliance with the law. 
11
 See Nagel (2005) for a similar argument. 
challenged by significant sectors of the population; more specifically: after civil wars. While 
‘domestic anarchy’ and ‘international anarchy’ differ in significant ways, examining the 
former can provide insights into the context of global democratization.    
A useful tool for answering the kind of questions stated above is Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis (QCA), which is a configurational method that has been developed by Charles 
Ragin and other scholars over the past 25 years.
12
 This method is particularly useful for the 
problem at hand because of three reasons. The first reason is that QCA is specifically aimed 
at testing hypotheses about necessary and sufficient conditions, rather than hypotheses about 
correlation among variables. QCA interprets statements about necessary conditions in logical 
and set-theoretic terms. To say that a condition is necessary for an outcome is equivalent to 
saying that cases where the outcome is present are a subset of the cases where the condition is 
present. This means that, if researchers find instances of the outcome that are not within the 
set of instances of the condition, then they can interpret this finding as contradicting the 
necessary condition hypothesis. 
The second advantage is that QCA is specifically designed to test verbal hypotheses whose 
terms are not ‘given’ but require careful interpretation. For instance, the hypothesis that 
cultural homogeneity is a necessary condition for democratic transitions is inherently vague 
and makes little sense without a careful definition of thresholds between homogeneous and 
non-homogeneous countries and between democratic transitions are other instances of regime 
change or stability. Over the past ten years, QCA has incorporated sophisticated procedures 
for the systematic analysis of ‘fuzzy’ concepts such as ‘democratic transition’. QCA now 
exists in two versions. In the ‘crisp-set’ version, conditions and outcomes are recorded as 
being either present or absent. In the ‘fuzzy-set’ version, cases can be recorded as being 
either ‘fully in’ the set of cases displaying a certain condition or outcome, or ‘fully out’ that 
set, or ‘partly in’ the set, with various degrees of membership. In other words, fuzzy-set QCA 
(fsQCA) allows researchers to code cases as having not only full membership and full non-
membership, but also degrees of membership. 
The third advantage is that the notion of necessity and sufficiency embodied in fsQCA is 
compatible with a ‘probabilistic’ approach to social science data, which does not force 
researchers to discard necessary conditions hypotheses because of the presence of a relatively 
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 For descriptions of the method see Ragin (2000, 2008) and Rihoux and Ragin (2009). 
small number of deviant cases (Goertz 2005). Statements about necessary conditions for 
democracy are rarely phrased in absolute terms with no allowance for exceptions.
13
 FsQCA 
takes this into account by providing ways to measure the strength of the set-theoretic 
relationship between conditions and outcomes. The key measure for the purpose of this 
chapter is ‘consistency’, which varies between 0 and 1 and measures the degree to which a 
set relation has been approximated, i.e., the degree to which the evidence is consistent with 
the argument that a set relation exists. If all cases where the outcome is present are found to 
be a subset of the cases where the condition is present, the consistency of that condition is 1, 
and that provides researchers with a strong reason to believe that the condition is necessary 
for the outcome. Perfectly consistent set relationship are rarely found in social research, and 
thus researchers may conclude that a condition is necessary even if its consistency is lower 
than 1. The lower the consistency score, however, the weaker are claims that a condition is 
necessary (Ragin 2006).
14
   
The rest of this section describes the data sources and assignment of fuzzy-set scores before 
presenting the findings, i.e. the consistency of cultural and ethnic homogeneity, economic 
development, economic equality, and small size as necessary conditions for transitions to 
democracy.    
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 The following statement by John Stuart Mill is typical: ‘Free institutions are next to impossible in a 
country made up of different nationalities’ (Mill 1991: 428, emphasis added). 
14
 FsQCA calculates the consistency of hypothesized necessary conditions according to the following 
formula:   
Consistency (Yi  Xi) = (min(Xi, Yi)) / (Yi),  
where X are the fuzzy-set values of the condition, Y are the fuzzy-set values of the outcome, and ‘min’ 
indicates the selection of the lower of the two values. 
It should be noted that in the fsQCA literature there are no established conventions on the minimum 
level of consistency that is needed to support a necessary condition hypothesis, or even on the criteria for 
determining what level is most appropriate given the features of the research problem. Schneider and Wageman 
(2007: 213) make a rare attempt to identify such a threshold by suggesting that only scores of ‘at least’ 0.9 
should be accepted in the case of necessary conditions.        
The outcome is membership in the ‘set of countries experiencing a major democratic 
transition’ and it is based on Polity IV values.15 The Polity IV project defines a ‘major 
democratic transition’ as a six points or greater increase in Polity value over a period of three 
years or less, including a shift from an autocratic Polity value (-10 to 0) to a partial 
democratic Polity value (+1 to +6) or full democratic Polity value (+7 to +10) or a shift from 
a partial democratic value to a full democratic value. The Polity project defines a ‘minor 
democratic transition’ as a three to five point increase in Polity values over a period of three 
years or less, which includes a shift from autocratic to partial democratic or from partial to 
full democratic value (Marshall and Jaggers 2009). I assign to countries experiencing a major 
democratic transition a fuzzy-set score of 1 in the set of countries experiencing a major 
democratic transition, whereas countries experiencing a minor democratic transition are 
assigned a fuzzy-set score of 0.5 in that set. 
I assign to each case of country experiencing a democratic transition one of four degrees of 
membership in the five causal conditions: ‘fully in’ (fuzzy-set score of 1), ‘more in than out’ 
(0.66), ‘more out than in’ (0.33), and ‘fully out’ (0.00).  
Membership in the ‘set of ethnically homogeneous countries’ is based on the database 
compiled by James Fearon (2003). The database includes an ethnic fractionalization index for 
most countries in the world, which measures the probability that two individuals selected at 
random from a country will be from different ethnic groups. The index ranges from 0 to 1 and 
depends on the number of ethnic groups as well as their share of the total population. I 
consider countries with an ethnic fractionalization index between 0 and 0.25 to be fully in the 
‘set of ethnically homogeneous countries’; countries with an ethnic fractionalization index 
between 0.25 and 0.50 are considered more in than out that set; countries with an ethnic 
fractionalization between 0.50 and 0.75 are considered more out than in the set; and countries 
whose ethnic fractionalization ranges between 0.75 and 1 are considered fully out the set. 
Fearon (2003) argues that measures of ethnic diversity are not always adequate to capture the 
political effects of cultural differences. For that reason, he also provides an index of cultural 
fractionalization that uses the distance between the ‘tree branches’ of two languages as a 
proxy of the cultural distance between groups that speak them as a first language. 
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 Polity IV scores suffer from a number of problems (see e.g. Munck and Verkuilen 2002; Treier and 
Jackman 2008), but they are probably more suitable than any other democracy measurement with comparable 
coverage of years and countries.  
Fractionalization is lower when groups speak a related language (e.g. Byelorussians and 
Russians in Belarus) and higher when the languages are structurally unrelated (e.g. Greeks 
and Turks in Cyprus). I consider countries with a cultural fractionalization index between 0 
and 0.25 to be fully in the ‘set of culturally homogeneous countries’; countries with an 
cultural fractionalization index between 0.25 and 0.50 are considered to be more in than out 
that set; countries with a cultural fractionalization between 0.50 and 0.75 are considered more 
out than in the set; and countries whose cultural fractionalization ranges between 0.75 and 1 
are considered fully out the set. 
Membership in the ‘set of economically developed countries’ is based on World Bank 
classification, which in turn is based on the GNI per capita of countries. I use the thresholds 
adopted by the World Bank in 1989, when it first introduced the four-fold classification on 
the basis of 1987 data (World Bank 2010a). Countries that, in the first year of the democratic 
transition, had a GDP per capita that exceeds the threshold used by the World Bank to 
identify ‘high-income’ countries (over $6000), are considered fully in the ‘set of 
economically developed countries’; countries that would have qualified as lower middle 
income country according to the 1987 World Bank criteria ($1,941-6,000) are considered 
more in than out the set; countries that would have qualified as lower middle income country 
($481-1,940) are considered ‘more out than in’ the set; and countries that would have 
qualified as a low income (less than $480) are considered ‘fully out’.16 GDP per capita data 
come from World Bank (2010b). 
Membership in the ‘set of economically equal countries’ is based on the Standardized World 
Income Inequality Database (SWIID) complied by Frederik Solt (2009), which in turn is 
based mainly on the World Income Inequality Database created by the World Institute for 
Development Economics Research of the U.N. University. The SWIID provides Gini indices 
of gross and net income inequality for 153 countries between 1960 and the present. I consider 
countries with a net (i.e. after tax and transfers) Gini index below 0.20 in the year of the 
democratic transition to be fully in the set of economically equal countries; countries with a 
net Gini index between 0.20 and 0.35 are more in than out that set; countries with a net Gini 
index between 0.35 and 0.50 are more out than in that set; and countries with a net Gini index 
over 0.50 are fully out.  
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 The country data I use are based on GDP per capita, whereas the World Bank thresholds refer to GNI 
per capita, but with a few exceptions (e.g. Ireland) the two indicators are similar. 
Membership in the ‘set of small countries’ is based on population data collected by Angus 
Maddison (2008). Countries with a population of 10 million or less in the first year of their 
democratic transition are fully in the set of small countries; countries with a population 
between 10 and 50 million are more in than out that set; countries with a population between 
50 and 100 million are more out than in; and countries with a population of over 100 million 
are fully out the set of small countries. 
Membership in the ‘set of countries with established statehood’ is based on whether a country 
experienced a civil war at any time during the ten years preceding the democratic transition. 
A score of 0 is assigned if this is the case, otherwise 1. The data on civil wars are from 
Sambanis (2004). As noted above, a civil war in recent history is an indication that a 
significant share of the population does not take a monopoly of legitimate violence for 
granted.  
The dataset on which the following analysis is based only includes countries that experienced 
either a major or minor democratic transition to democracy, as defined above. This is 
consistent with the general principle that cases not displaying the outcome of interest are not 
relevant for testing necessary condition hypotheses (as opposed to sufficient condition 
hypotheses).
17
 The Polity IV database includes 151 cases of major democratic transition and 
34 cases of minor transition between 1800 and 2009.
18
 Because of issues of data availability, 
only a subset of these cases is included in the following analysis. First, only democratic 
transitions that occurred between 1945 and 2009 are considered. Second, a few cases from 
this period are excluded because of lack of data on one or more causal conditions. Other two 
limitations should be noted. First, since Fearon’s ethnic and cultural fractionalization index is 
not available for multiple years, the analysis is based on the assumption that the index 
approximates a country’s situation at the time of the transition, given the relatively slow 
changes in the ethnic composition of most countries and the low likelihood that such changes 
are substantial enough to shift countries across the four categories used here. Second, when 
data on per capita income and income inequality are not available for the year of transition, 
figures for the nearest available year are used. 
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 Ragin (2000). This principle is not entirely uncontroversial: see for instance the debate between 
Seawright (2002), Braumoeller and Goertz (2002), and Clarke (2002).  
18
 Counting only the first year of a multiyear democratic transition, and counting democratic transitions 
in non-contiguous years in the same country as separate cases.    
Table 1 summarizes which outcome and conditions are analysed, how they are measured and 
which sources are used. 
 
 
Table 9.1: Summary of outcome, conditions, measurements and sources 
Outcome Measure Source 
Major and minor 
democratic transition 
Change in Polity value (see text 
for details) 
Marshall and Jaggers 
(2009) 
Conditions Measure Source 
Ethnic homogeneity Ethnic fractionalization index Fearon (2003) 
Cultural homogeneity Cultural fractionalization index Fearon (2003) 
Economic development GDP per capita World Bank (2010b) 
Economic equality Net Gini index Solt (2009) 
Small size Population Maddison (2008) 
Established statehood No civil war in previous 10 years Sambanis (2004) 
 
 
I conducted the analysis on 126 cases of democratic transition. Applying the procedures 
implemented in the fsQCA 2.0 software (Ragin et al. 2006) yields the following consistency 




Ethnic homogeneity:  0.500427              
Cultural homogeneity: 0.716667              
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 FsQCA provides a second criterion for assessing set-theoretic relationships – ‘coverage’ – but 
coverage values are not reported here, because none of the set relations examined in this analysis can be 
regarded as consistent. See Ragin (2006: 9) for details.  
Economic development: 0.262735              
Economic equality:  0.354274              
Small size:  0.762393 
Established statehood: 0.653846           
 
The consistency values for all six conditions are well below 1, which suggests that none of 
these conditions can be regarded as a necessary for democratic transitions. Size is somewhat 
more consistent than the others, but this is likely to be due to skewed membership scores (see 
Ragin 2006: 8), and in any case the consistency score is too low to support the conclusion 
that it is a necessary condition. The low consistency of established statehood (i.e. no civil war 
in the preceding 10 years) is especially notable, and the implication that democracy can 
emerge from ‘anarchy’ is consistent with Wantchekon’s (2004) finding that nearly 40 per 




In sum, the ‘structural’ conditions included in this analysis may perhaps increase the 
likelihood of a democratic transition, but the evidence does not support the contention that 
they are necessary, even taking into account the possibility of exceptions to the general 
pattern. 
However, one further possibility should be considered: even if none of the conditions 
examined can be considered necessary for democratic transition, the presence of at least one 
of them – any of them – may be necessary for it. In other words, it could be that, in order to 
experience a democratic transition, a country needs to be ethnically/culturally homogeneous 
or economically developed or economically equal or small or with established statehood; the 
simultaneous lack of all these conditions may prevent a democratic transition. Elsewhere 
(Koenig-Archibugi 2010) I argue that India contradicts such a ‘conditional necessity’ 
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 Since organized groups fighting each other in civil wars are often not internally democratic, this 
finding can also shed some light on an important question addressed by Archibugi (2008) and others: can a 
global democratic polity emerge only from the union of political units that are already democratic themselves? 
By using a domestic analogy, the fact that democracy can emerge from a condition of anarchy (and even war) 
among organized groups that are not necessarily democratic provides some reasons to answer that question in 
the negative. I am grateful to Daniele Archibugi for highlighting the importance of the question.  
conjecture: India is a heterogeneous, poor, unequal and large country and yet it possesses 
stable democratic institutions. However, fsQCA allows us to test the conditional necessity 
conjecture more systematically.
21
 If we treat ‘cultural homogeneity or economic development 
or economic equality or small size’ as a possible necessary condition, then its consistency 
score is 0.881368, which appears still too low to support the conclusion that it is a necessary 
condition. On the other hand, an expression that includes established statehood achieves a 
higher score: ‘established statehood or cultural homogeneity or economic equality or small 
size’ has a consistency of 0.939231. Given that some authors suggest that consistency scores 
should be ‘at least’ 0.90 for a necessary condition hypothesis to be confirmed,22 that 
disjunctive expression may be seen as passing (just) the threshold required for an affirmative 
verdict. 
The preceding analysis only considered ‘structural’ conditions, neglecting the agency-based 
and strategic conditions that are emphasised by a sizeable part of the democratization 
literature. As noted above, ascertaining the necessity of such agential conditions is difficult 
because of the absence (to the best of my knowledge) of a dataset that provides a 
standardized description of the political constellation of all or most countries that have 
experienced a democratic transition in their history. However, political scientists have 
accumulated a substantial amount of knowledge on the political processes and strategies that 
resulted in democratic transitions. Do any necessary conditions emerge from this literature? 
While this chapter cannot provide a comprehensive answer, there are reasons to believe that 
agential theories are no better than structural theories in uncovering necessary conditions 
across a large number of countries. Barbara Geddes (1999) notes that the initially proposed 
generalization that divisions within the authoritarian regime were an essential condition of 
transitions was disproved by later developments in the Soviet bloc. Conversely, popular 
mobilization was unimportant as a cause of democratization in early studies focusing on 
Latin America, but then appeared to be crucial in Eastern Europe. Studies of Latin America 
and Europe stressed the importance of pacts among elites, but there is little evidence of pacts 
in African cases of democratization. Geddes (1999: 119) notes that ‘[v]irtually every 
suggested generalization to arise from this literature […] has been challenged.’ We can 
                                                 
21
 I am grateful to Robert Goodin for suggesting this ‘disjunctive’ analysis.  
22
 See Schneider and Wagemann (2007) referred to in footnote  
conclude that the agency-oriented research tradition has not found conditions that can be 
regarded as unambiguously necessary rather than merely supportive.   
 
 
Thinking about paths to global democracy 
The findings of the previous section appear to support the commonly held view that ‘there is 
no single path to democracy, and, therefore, no generalization is to be had about the 
conditions that give rise to it’ (Shapiro 2003: 80)23. While Shapiro’s inference that no 
generalization can be made is questionable, the claim that there are multiple paths to 
democracy is now widely accepted. One of the challenges for analysts of domestic 
democratization has been to identify those paths theoretically and empirically, and to develop 
hypotheses on the causes and consequences of different paths. One of the challenges for 
analysts of global democratization is to extract the most relevant insights from this literature 
and apply them to actual instances of change in particular international institutional contexts 
(Uhlin 2010) or to stylized accounts of future large-scale transformations (Goodin 2010).   
One way in which the literature on domestic democratization has tried to make the idea of 
multiple paths more specific is by developing typologies of ‘modes of transition’. Huntington 
(1991), for instance, distinguished between ‘transformations’, where the elites in power lead 
the transition, ‘replacements’, where opposition groups lead the transition, and 
‘transplacements’, where elites in power and opposition groups cooperate in the transition. 
Karl (1990) distinguished between possible modes of transition to democracy on the basis of 
two criteria: first, whether democratic transitions result from strategies based primarily on 
overt force or rather from compromise; second, whether incumbent ruling elites or mass 
actors have predominant power. Intersecting these distinctions produces four ideal types of 
democratic transition: reform, revolution, imposition, and pact. Similarly, Munck and Leff 
(1997) classified modes of transition by asking two questions: whether the agent of change is 
the incumbent elite or a counterelite or a combination of the two; and whether the strategy of 
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 Shapiro continues: ‘Democracy can result from decades of gradual evolution (Britain and the United 
States), imitation (India), cascades (most of Eastern Europe in 1989), collapse (Russia after 1991), imposition 
from above (Chile), revolutions (Portugal), negotiated settlements (Poland, Nicaragua, and South Africa), or 
external imposition (Japan and West Germany)… Perhaps there are other possibilities’ (Shapiro 2003: 80).  
the agent of change is confrontation or accommodation or a combination of the two. Various 
combinations of these criteria generate several modes of transition, notably four ‘pure’ modes 
– revolution from above, social revolution, conservative reform, and reform from below – 
and three ‘mixed’ modes – reform through rupture, reform through extrication and reform 
through transaction. 
Mutatis mutandis, these typological exercises can provide useful building blocks for 
theorizing pathways to global democracy. But it should be noted that they do not (aim to) 
identify the conditions under which the actors’ strategies will actually result in democratic 
transitions. This is partly a consequence of the high level of generality of the categories on 
which such typologies are based. Notably, the distinction between ruling elite and 
counterelite, or between ruling elite and mass actors, offers little information on the 
likelihood that actors’ strategies will succeed or even on the relative amounts of power 
resources that those groups can mobilize in pursuit of their goals. 
Analyses in the tradition of macrohistorical comparative sociology tend to display lower 
levels of indeterminacy. They usually start from structuralist premises about historically 
developing class structures and political structures and ascribe broadly defined (material and 
ideational) interests to members of particular classes and state elites. According to one of the 
most significant contributions to this tradition, Barrington Moore’s The Social Origins of 
Dictatorship and Democracy, countries reach one or the other of three political outcomes – 
parliamentary democracy, fascist dictatorship, and communist dictatorship – depending on 
the relative strength of states, land-owning classes, peasants, and bourgeois classes. Moore 
argued that a strong bourgeoisie was a necessary component of all paths to democracy: ‘No 
bourgeoisie, no democracy’ (Moore 1966: 418). However, a strong bourgeoisie was not 
described as sufficient to produce democracy, and the paths to democracy of the three main 
cases studies by Moore - Britain, France and the United States – displayed significant 
differences. Adopting a similar macrohistorical comparative approach, Rueschemeyer et al. 
(1992) reached a different conclusion: the ‘crucial’ explanatory variable in the development 
of democracy is the relative size and density of the industrial working class, which had most 
to gain from and was most favourable to democracy. (Their case studies reveal several 
exceptions to the general pattern, notably the ‘agrarian democracies’ of the early United 
States, Switzerland, and Norway). They conclude that ‘Significant working-class strength 
was a necessary condition for the installation and consolidation of full democracy, but it was 
not a sufficient condition’ (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992: 282). Among the other relevant factors 
are the ideologies of the groups leading working-class mobilization, and strong allies among 
the urban and rural middle classes. 
For a number of reasons, these and other macrohistorical theories to domestic 
democratization cannot be applied directly to the analysis of actual and potential trends in the 
democratization of global politics.
24
 One of those reasons is that the traditional class divisions 
highlighted by these theories are reflected only very weakly in a dimension that is arguably 
very important for the prospects of global democracy: the distinction between those holding 
‘cosmopolitan’ identities and values and those who do not. Opinion surveys across a large 
number of developed and developing countries show that the degree of ‘moral 
cosmopolitanism’ and ‘political cosmopolitanism’ of individuals bears a very weak 
relationship to their income and education (Furia 2005). Furia notes that ‘Knowing a person’s 
educational attainment and income provides only a tiny hint about whether she will be 
favourably disposed towards ideals of global citizenship’ (Furia 2005: 348). Nor are 
cosmopolitan political orientations more common in richer countries than in poor countries, 
as the BBC poll cited above shows. A straightforward ‘class analysis’ of potential transition 
paths to global democracy is thus likely to miss important drivers of support for and 
resistance to global democratic projects. 
However, macrosociological studies on domestic transitions can inspire analyses on global 
transitions with regard to two important elements. First, different transition paths to 
democracy are feasible depending on which social groups play a leadership role. Second, the 
success of those transition paths depends crucially on the ability of the leading group to build 
a broad coalition in support of the transition.
25
 In other words, analysts may speculate on the 
various ‘minimum winning coalitions’. The identification of the various relevant groups is of 
course crucial to such an exercise. Some of them are predominantly based in individual 
states, whereas others have significant transnational dimensions. Among the former, 
‘segmented’, groups are of course governments, but also sectoral bureaucracies, 
parliamentarians, political parties, domestic pressure groups such as trade unions and 
employers’ organizations, and – with less capacity for collective action – various groups of 
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 For an insightful discussion in the context of EU democratization see Schimmelfennig (2010). 
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 A further important ‘lesson’ of domestic democratization has been stressed by (Goodin 2010): How 
expansions of democratic accountability come about may be less important for the long-term prospects of 
democracy than the fact that, once it is expanded, accountability almost never contracts.    
voters (defined in the basis of age cohorts, economic class, education, minority status, or 
degree of involvement in international economic or social networks). Among the 
transnational, ‘interlinked’, groups are transnational capitalists, networks of activists and 
NGOs, officials of international organizations, and a range of ‘epistemic communities’ (Haas 
1990).  
On the basis of a mapping of leading groups and their allies, as well as their opponents, it 
could be possible to identify several paths to global democracy, as well as the shifts in 
material, ideational, and institutional resources that could allow reformist coalitions to prevail 
over conservative coalitions. The following is a tentative and incomplete list of such paths:  
 
 An intergovernmental path, possibly based on a government-driven reform and 
strengthening of the UN system, which would generate a need for democratic 
legitimacy that could be met by the establishment of a global parliamentary assembly 
and eventually the popular election of its members. This path would essentially 
replicate what happened in the EU (Rittberger 2005, Schimmelfennig 2010). 
 A social movement path, where global networks of activists and civil society 
organizations create non-state democratic institutions (see K. Macdonald 2011, in this 
volume) and/or campaign successfully for the democratization of primarily 
intergovernmental institutions (see Tallberg and Uhlin 2011, in this volume, Uhlin 
2010, Scholte 2011). 
 A labourist path, where international labour unions lead a progressive coalition for the 
democratization of world governance (Boswell and Chase-Dunn 2000: 239-246; 
Stevis and Boswell 2008). The role of the organized working classes would parallel 
their historic role in promoting domestic democratization (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992).  
 A capitalist path, where transnational business demands and obtains strengthened 
global governance institutions, which then could then function as focal point for 
democratization efforts (Boswell and Chase-Dunn 2000; 214-215).
26
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 Two prominent proponents of a global parliamentary assembly note that ‘many of the leading figures 
in world business seem to find congenial the idea that some sort of democratizing improvisation along the lines 
we are suggesting is necessary to make globalization politically acceptable to more of the peoples of the world’ 
(Falk and Strauss 2003: 224). Marxist analysts such as Chimni (2011, in this volume) are of course sceptical that 
global capitalism and genuine global democracy can be reconciled. 
 A functionalist path, where democratization follows the establishment of sectoral but 
increasingly dense governance networks among specialized bureaucracies (Slaughter 
2005). 
 Even an imperialist path, where a dominant power institutionalizes its dominance over 
the rest of the world and then eventually accedes to demands for democratic 
representation.    
 
Some of these paths appear incompatible with others, while others may be complementary 
and converging. Arguably different paths may lead to different outcomes, although such 
varied outcomes may all pass the kind of ‘democratic threshold’ envisaged by Dahl. It could 
turn out to be impossible to estimate the likelihood that they will lead to successful global 
democratization, but researchers may well be able to assess their relative plausibility by 
extrapolating trends on the global distribution of various forms of power among state and 
non-state actors.  
This is an extremely ambitious research agenda, but it would constitute a worthwhile – 
perhaps necessary – complement to the more prescriptively oriented approaches to global 
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